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Bilateral Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions: The Impact 




The EU has indicated that after 2008 its trade relationships with developing countries will be 
dominated by the development of preferential trade agreements. Although not a consequence of 
the Cotonou Agreement, the free trade agreement between the EU and the Republic of South 
Africa (EU RSA FTA) is clearly one of the first fruits of this approach to trade relationships. 
However, there is no evidence that the design of the EU RSA FTA incorporated a comprehensive 
general equilibrium evaluation of the agreement for either the signatories or the other southern 
African nations. The analyses reported here indicate that while the EU RSA FTA may 
substantially benefit the signatories, there are appreciable negative impacts for other states, 
especially the RSA’s immediate neighbours. Moreover, the reluctance of the EU to fully 
liberalise trade in food and agriculture commodities results in a major reduction in the benefits for 






The Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU) has five members, the Republic of South Africa 
(RSA), 2 and Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, 3 the so-called BLNS countries, and is 
the world’s longest standing customs union (established in 1910). For most of SACU’s existence 
the BLNS countries were colonies. A legacy of those political arrangements was that SACU’s 
trade relations were determined, almost unilaterally, by the RSA: a situation that is now a subject 
of negotiations. Since the late 1980s SACU’s trade barriers have been severely reduced, and 
hence the tariff revenues received by the member states under SACU’s tariff revenue sharing 
formula have also declined. The BLNS governments were historically dependent on tariff 
revenue, and although the importance of tariff revenues has declined for Botswana and 
Swaziland, the governments of Lesotho and Namibia have more limited alternative revenue 
raising capacities. Recently the government of the RSA has entered into a (unilateral) free trade 
agreement with the EU (EU RSA FTA), and is further considering the possibility of a (unilateral) 
free trade agreement with MERCUSOR.4 The BLNS countries have expressed concern about the 
implications of the EU RSA FTA for their economies, and to date have not endorsed the 
arrangements. 
An important feature of the EU RSA FTA is the implicit asymmetry of trade liberalisation 
between the EU and the BLNS countries. Because of the SACU, the EU RSA FTA effectively 
grants the EU free access to the markets of the BLNS countries but does not grant the BLNS 
countries reciprocal access to the EU’s markets.5 With the proliferation of preferential trade 
agreements (PTA) since the forming of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) it is likely that 
more and more PTAs will be formed between states that are signatories to other agreements, and 
where the preferences provided by a new agreement do not extend to other countries in existing 
agreements. How these multiple agreements interact is likely to become an important 
consideration in both the framing of PTAs and in efforts to ensure that PTAs do not have adverse 
unintended effects. In particular it may be deemed important to ensure that the least developed 
nations, who are small, vulnerable and disproportionately concentrated in Africa, are not 
adversely affected. 
This paper reports the results from a comparative static variant of the GTAP model that 
quantifies the impact on Botswana of the EU RSA FTA. Hence, by definition, the analyses are 
concerned with the impact of an FTA upon a small country. The model is calibrated using data 
from GTAP 5. The southern Africa disaggregation in GTAP 5 separately identifies Botswana 
from the rest of SACU, and hence for the first time renders possible analyses of intra-SACU 
relationships, albeit partial analyses. A novel feature of the analyses is the modeling of the 
                                                 
2 Throughout this paper the abbreviation RSA will be used to refer to the political entity of the Republic of South 
Africa. The term South Africa will be reserved for use defining the region identified in the GTAP Data Base 
that includes the RSA, along with Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia. 
3 Throughout this paper countries will be referred to by their current names rather than the names in use at those 
points in time being discussed. 
4 Strictly speaking the term free trade agreement is inappropriate. The EU RSA FTA does not include the 
complete liberalisation of trade between the EU and the RSA, and hence the agreement would be better 
described as a preferential trade agreement if the terms are to be consistent with the literature. However, the EU 
and RSA have adopted the term FTA. 
5 This assumes that rules of origin are effective. The complications raised by rules of origin are sidestepped in the 
analyses reported below and therefore are not discussed in this paper. This of course does not render them 
irrelevant. 
 4 
revenue sharing arrangements of SACU. The tariff revenues for SACU are pooled and then 
divided between the two regions on the basis of a revenue sharing formula. The paper will report 
model simulations that assess both the impact of the EU RSA FTA on Botswana, South Africa 
and other regions, where South Africa is defined as the SACU states other than Botswana. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews the 
history and current state of the SACU. Section 3 surveys the basic arrangements proposed 
by the EU RSA FTA. The data and model used for the analyses are described in the two 
sub-sections of section 4, with descriptions of the policy experiments and comments on 
the results appearing in section 5. Concluding comments appear in section 6. 
II. Southern African Customs Union 
The SACU was formed in 1910 between the RSA and Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland 
(BLS). The origins of the SACU therefore coincide with the establishment of the RSA 
and during a period in history when the BLS states were colonies/protectorates of the 
UK. Moreover, the SACU was a union between states that were very unequal (Table 1 
provides some structural information about the SACU members for more recent years) 
and different in terms of size and economic wealth and geographic location. From the late 
19th century the mineral wealth of the RSA was well known and the object of large 
investments and rapid expansions, which contributed to rapidly rising incomes for the 
Caucasian minority.6 There was a buoyant demand for labour throughout the RSA, which 
stimulated the development of migrant labour schemes to support the mines and cities of 
the RSA. The migrant labour schemes operated throughout southern Africa, but were 
particularly important for the BLS economies and encouraged the development of a 
partially integrated labour market in the SACU, but the inter country flows of labour have 
never been free. The lack of comparable development in the BLS countries resulted in 
remittances from migrant labour to the BLS countries being important components of 
national income (see for instance Lucas and Stark, 1985a and b, and Stark and Lucas, 
1988). The economic dominance of the RSA was compounded by the geographic 
dependence of the BLS countries. Lesotho is completely surrounded by South Africa, 
while Botswana’s key trade routes pass through South Africa.7 Swaziland does possess 
greater alternatives because of its proximity to Maputo. 
                                                 
6 Although average incomes for Caucasians rose rapidly their distribution was heavily skewed, as was the 
distribution of economic power. 
7 Botswana has access by rail to the sea through Zimbabwe (on ‘Rhodes’s’ railway) and since 1999 by road 
across the Kalahari to Walvis Bay in Namibia. 
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Table 1 Structural Characteristics of the SACU Member States 
 RSA Botswana Lesotho Namibia Swaziland
      
Area (sq km) 1,221,040 566,730 30,350 823,290 17,200 
1965      
GNP per capita ($ curr) 520 80 60 .. 180 
Population (‘000) 19,832 549 963 713 370 
GDP ($USm curr) 10,755 46 55 .. 78 
Shares of GDP      
Agriculture 10.14 36.04 65.24 .. 34.66 
Industry 41.39 20.45 4.81 .. 32.99 
Manufacturing 23.92 12.34 0.80 .. 8.56 
Services 48.48 50.00 29.95 .. 32.36 
1999      
GNP per capita ($ curr) 3,160 3,020 770 2,000 1,170 
Population (‘000) 41,457 1,450 1,980 1,545 900 
GDP ($USm curr) 130,220 5,053 957 3,475 1,326 
Shares of GDP      
Agriculture 4.68 5.09 10.09 .. 9.03 
Industry 31.44 46.44 55.51 .. 85.62 
Manufacturing 24.06 3.97 18.10 .. 36.30 
Services 63.88 48.48 34.40 .. 5.35 
Source: World Development Indicators 
 
Over and above these factors lies the matter of political status. As colonies with few known 
resources and apparently little economic worth to the UK, the BLS countries had little or no say 
over the direction of the SACU. A situation that also applied to Namibia, who became a de facto 
member of the SACU when the RSA took political control under a League of Nations mandate. 
Consequently it is not surprising that the arrangements of the SACU were dominated by the RSA 
until the BLS countries gained independence. 
The SACU provides for a common external tariff and complete free trade in commodities 
between the member states, whilst granting transit rights across the RSA for the other members. 
Tariff revenues are collected by the RSA and then distributed among the members according to a 
revenue sharing formula. The degree of integration is assisted by the use of a common currency, 
except in Botswana where the exchange rate is managed such that, to a substantial degree, the 
Pula tracks the Rand. 
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While the SACU remains an agreement between unequal states, there has been a substantial 
change since the late 1960s. The BLS countries gained independent political status in the 1960s, 
and this was undoubtedly a major factor behind the renegotiation of the SACU agreement in 
1969, which produced a revised agreement that came into being on 1st March 1970. Similarly, 
when Namibia gained independence from the RSA, in 1990, it became an independent political 
entity in the SACU. The ending of the apartheid regime in the RSA has heralded the start of a 
further renegotiation of the SACU agreement. While there is evidence that the revised 
institutional arrangements have been agreed and that a new revenue sharing formula has been 
provisionally agreed, other matters (see below) are blocking a final agreement (MFDP, 2001). 
Table 1 indicates the degree to which the relative economic performances of the SACU 
members have changed over time. The RSA remains the dominant economic force, but this is 
increasingly a consequence of the size of its population and the relative strength of its industrial 
base rather than crude income per capita. Historially the RSA enjoyed carte blanche over the 
setting of tariff and excise duty rates for SACU, and used implicit threats, not least over transit 
rights, to reinforce its control. Consequently the development of trade policies within the SACU 
was determined by the ‘development’ agenda of the RSA. 
The post second world war era saw the RSA adopt increasingly inward looking development 
strategies. These policies emphasised import substituting industrialization (ISI), the development 
of ‘strategic’ industries and downstream processing of mineral products. But, unlike many other 
countries pursuing ISI style policies, agriculture was heavily supported.8 What is not clear is the 
extent to which the core economic policy vision was some form of ISI strategy as opposed to 
being driven by the political ideology of apartheid and subsequent responses to international 
opprobrium. Nevertheless it is clear that by the late 1980s the RSA, and hence SACU, had 
acquired a bewildering array of trade policy instruments; quantitative restrictions, multiple tariff 
lines, a multiplicity of forms of protection, all overridden by exemptions (see Holden, 1992, for a 
review). For agriculture these instruments were compounded by price controls, marketing boards, 
ordinances, statutes and regulations (see Vink and Kassier, 1992). The degree to which these 
trade policies were responsible for the two decades of stagnation and decline, and the three and 
half-year recession that the RSA experienced before the change of government in April 1994 will 
probably never be fully known. It is difficult to believe that the trade policies made no 
contribution, but equally it is hard to argue a case that ignores the other policies of the apartheid 
era, especially those policies that contributed to the chronic shortage of skilled labour and how 
international ostracisation contributed to the confusing plethora of duty rates and instruments. 
What cannot be disputed is that the BLNS countries were at least partly compelled, through 
membership of the SACU, to follow the trade policies of the RSA. Even before the change of 
government the protectionist policies had become unsustainable and the RSA embarked on a 
regime of progressive reform. Agricultural support policies were substantially dismantled, which 
given the dependence of the BLNS countries on food imports should have produced positive 
welfare effects.9 Similarly other tariffs were reduced, but the SACU tariff structure remains 
complex (see Lewis, 2001). 
                                                 
8 The political influence of farmers (Boers) probably increased when the National Party came to power, but the 
protection of agriculture long predates that event, e.g., the 1913 Land Act (see Binswanger and Deininger, 
1993, and Deininger and Binswanger, 1995). 
9 There was also a move away from self-sufficiency to food-security within Botswana during the late 1990s. 
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III. The EU Republic of South Africa Free Trade Agreement 
The trade relationships between southern and eastern African states are difficult to disentangle. A 
plethora of trade and economic cooperation agreements exist both between the states of the region 
and between states within the region and outside. The major multi lateral agreements are the 
SACU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Cross-Border Initiative (CBI). How each is 
impacting upon the performance of any individual state is difficult to clearly articulate since the 
memberships of each agreement are not exclusive (see Lewis, 2001). Currently the most 
comprehensive organisation, in terms of membership, is COMESA but it appears to be somewhat 
fragile. In the longer term it may be that SADC emerges as the primary organisation among 
southern African states; one vision of the SADC agreement is a common market with free 
movements of commodities, capital, labour and services. However progress towards those 
objectives seems to be slow with the majority of agreements being partial, e.g., trade concessions 
to Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia by the SACU under the SADC Trade Protocol. 
At the moment therefore the SACU remains the only trade agreement in southern Africa that 
is fully functioning. In this context the EU RSA FTA, and the ongoing talks between RSA and 
MERCUSOR and Brazil,10 represent an interesting departure. In particular they raise the 
question of how long a customs union can continue to operate when one member engages in 
unilateral negotiations with third parties that will ultimately lead to changes in common tariff 
rates. 
The EU RSA FTA originated in 1995 in response to a proposal by the EU. It would seem that 
the RSA was initially primarily interested in acquiring full Lomé Convention membership, but 
when the RSA only achieved partial membership the prospect of gaining greater access to the EU 
market through a FTA seems to have been regarded as an attractive alternative. In light of the 
Cotonou agreement and the EU’s subsequent commitment to seek regional trade agreements 
(RTA) with ACP (African, Caribbean and Pacific) countries and other developing countries, 
whilst phasing out the preferential commodity agreements, the EU’s proposals to the RSA would 
seem to fit a pattern that has subsequently emerged. 
Agreement on the EU RSA FTA finally came in 1999. The agreement covers the vast 
majority of commodities, although there are a number of contentious issues remaining 
particularly with respect to the EU retaining protection for certain ‘sensitive’ agricultural 
products. To all intents and purposes the EU agreed to phase out all trade barriers with the RSA 
over 10 years while the RSA reciprocated over 12 years, with the exception of some ‘sensitive’ 
food and agricultural commodities. The programme of mutual liberalisation includes a banding of 
products according to the stage in the liberalisation process at which the trade barriers would be 
reduced; it has been suggested that the slow implementation of agricultural trade liberalisation, 
especially for products in which the RSA is expected to have export potential (vegetables, fruit, 
meat and some wines) mean that the RSA’s gains might be limited. This argument is further 
supported by the more rapid liberalisation of trade in manufactured than agricultural 
commodities. 
Despite the EU and the RSA reaching agreement on the FTA in 1999, it remains unratified by 
the BLNS countries. Beside the obvious political questions raised by the FTA, there are a number 
                                                 
10 It appears that the BLNS countries were first informed of these talks and a possible RSA MERCUSOR FTA in 
September 2000. 
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of important economic questions. Of particular concern to the BLNS countries is the question of 
how the EU RSA FTA will impact upon their economies. While several CGE studies using 
GTAP 4 data (Lewis et al., 1999; Penzhorn, 2000) have suggested that SACU as a whole would 
benefit, these studies have been constrained by the data base to not address the issue of the 
distribution of gains and losses within SACU. One study (IDS and BIDPA, 1998) suggested that 
the BLNS countries would experience relatively minor effects in terms of trade flows, on the 
basis of a commodity flow model. However it was noted that the revenue effects, principally for 
Lesotho and Namibia, might be appreciable, although Botswana would be relatively unaffected 
due to its low dependence on trade taxes. 
It may be that the potential benefits of the EU RSA FTA depend upon the dynamic effects of 
the agreement. For instance, if the agreement fosters faster growth in the RSA then it could be 
argued that the BLNS countries would benefit by the trade creation effect of RSA growth. 
However, this presumes that the BLNS countries would capture an appreciable share of import 
expansion by the RSA, an outcome that may be doubtful given the currently low level of 
penetration of the RSA market by BLNS exports. In the meantime ratification of the EU RSA 
FTA by the BLNS countries must almost certainly await a final agreement on a support and 
compensation package for the BLNS countries. A key problem with such a package will be 
quantification, which is a process to which this study seeks to contribute. 
IV. Data and Model 
The data and model used for the analyses reported here derive from the Global Trade Analysis 
Project (GTAP). The heart of the GTAP is its data base that contains a fully articulated record of 
trade transactions and duties between different regions for a range of commodities (see Gehlhar et 
al., 1997). The number of regions and commodities has increased steadily with each release of the 
data base, such that GTAP 5, the fifth release, has data for 66 regions and 57 commodities. 
Associated with the data base is the GTAP model (see Hertel and Tsigas, 1997). This is a 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) model that incorporates one particular specification of 
behavioural relationships that are consistent with the data; as with all CGE models, this represents 
one of many possible specifications.11 The GTAP model is typically solved in rates of change, 
although again this is a matter of preference rather than substance.12 
Data 
The trade transactions, recorded in the GTAP Data Base (Dimaranan and McDougall, 2002), 
distinguish between commodities on the basis of their regions of origin and destination, but also 
on the basis of the agents (intermediate demand, and final demand by household, government and 
investment13) that absorb the commodities in the importing economy. This provides a method for 
                                                 
11 Lewis et al., (1999 and 2001) report results from an alternative specification of CGE model using data from 
GTAP. 
12 Lewis et al., (1999 and 2001) use a CGE model that is solved in terms of levels using the GAMS software. 
Rutherford (2000) has produced a specification of the GTAP model that is solved using the GAMS software. 
The GTAP model uses the GEMPACK software. 
13  Note trade data is provided on the basis of commodity, source and destination.  Imports are also provided on the 
basis of agent, commodity and importing region.  Trade data is not available by commodity, agent, source and 
destination. 
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allowing for the varying import intensities by different agents within a region.14 Trade tax data 
are recorded for each and every trade transaction. 
The remaining data in the GTAP Data Base are region specific and serve primarily to support 
the trade data and the trade focus of its intended applications. Domestic absorption is accounted 
for by intermediate demand, and final demand by the household, government and investment. 
Domestic agents not only pay import duties, but commodity purchases are also subject to sales 
taxes. Domestic supply is provided by activities that each produce a single characteristic 
commodity, which is either sold on the domestic market or exported. In addition to purchasing 
intermediate inputs, the activities also purchase combinations of five primary factors – land, 
capital, natural resources and skilled and unskilled labour – and pay indirect/production taxes. 
The ‘regional’ household receives all income from factor sales. This income is then distributed to 
the private household,15 savings and government. There are five different tax instruments – 
import and export duties, sales/commodity taxes, production taxes and factor taxes.16 The capital 
account draws together savings by the regional household and the rest of the world (external 
balance), and disburses those funds to investment by commodity (domestic and imported). 
 
Table 2 Model Commodities and Regions 
Model Commodities Model Region 
Crop Agriculture Botswana 
Animal Agriculture South Africa 
Fuels & Minerals Rest of SADC 
Food Products Rest of Africa 
Textiles EU 
Heavy Manufacturing NAFTA 
Light Manufacturing MERCUSOR 
Utilities Rest of Europe 
Construction Rest of America 
Services Rest of the World 
 
The model used for this study uses data from the GTAP 5 Data Base. Although the data bases 
allows for 57 commodities and 66 regions the analyses reported here uses a 10 commodity (2 
agriculture, 1 extraction, 4 manufacturing, utilities, construction and services) by 10-region (4 
                                                 
14 All known CGE models use variants of the Armington assumption (Armington, 1969) and therefore the results 
of policy experiments are sensitive to both substitution elasticities and trade shares (see de Melo and Robinson, 
1989). 
15 The single household specification means that GTAP models can only provide limited information on the 
within country income distribution implications of policy changes. 
16 The recorded factor tax rates are minimal. The data base does not include income taxes, even for regions where 
they represent a substantial component of government income; effectively they are subsumed within the 
distribution of the income of the regional households as fixed shares. 
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Africa, 2 Europe, 3 Americas, and Rest of World) aggregation. The commodity and region groups 
used for this model’s data base are listed in Table 2, while details of the aggregation mappings 
used are reported in Appendix 1. The commodity and regional aggregations reflect the known 
patterns of trade and the various trade agreements that have been entered into or are anticipated 
for the RSA and the SACU. A distinctive feature of the regional aggregation is the identification 
of Botswana as a separate entity from SACU; this allows the analyses to assess the intra-SACU 
implications of reform that Lewis et al., (1999) and Penzhorn (2000) could not address, and the 
identification of a region for the rest of SADC, which allows consideration of the impact of the 
agreement upon the RSA’s southern African partners. Hereafter the regions Botswana, South 
Africa and rest of SADC will be referred to collectively as SADC.17 
However, as of mid 2002, the GTAP 5 Data Base does not report common import tariff rates 
for Botswana and South Africa, despite them being members of a customs union. The differences 
in the tariff rates are sufficiently large as to indicate that this is not a consequence of the 
aggregation used in the data base. It is therefore necessary to adjust the data base so that common 
tariff rates exist for Botswana and South Africa. Furthermore, while SACU members impose 
common tariff rates they do not receive the revenue directly, rather the revenue is pooled and 
distributed according to a revenue sharing formula. Hence the revenue to each SACU member 
differs from that implied by the common tariff rates and the country specific imports. This 
requires an accounting for intra-SACU transfers that are not identified in the GTAP Data Base. 
The initial shares of tariff revenue were calculated from the data in GTAP 5, wherein the total 
tariff revenue of the SACU region was divided amongst Botswana and South Africa in the 
proportions 5.57 percent and 94.43 percent respectively.18 The data base was then shocked, using 
the ‘altertax’ closure due to Malcolm (1998), to impose common tariff rates and to obtain the 
actual shares of tariff revenue received by Botswana and South Africa under the revenue sharing 
formula. The ‘altertax’ closure and parameter files are designed so as to minimise the effect of the 
shock on the data base.19 This resulted in a slight change in the revenue shares from the tariff 
revenue pool; Botswana’s share was increased to 6.31 percent and South Africa’s share decreased 
to 93.69 percent. 
Descriptive Statistics20 
It is important to appreciate some of the structural characteristics for the regions in the model’s 
data base. The regions in the model are very different in (economic) size, Figure 1. The EU, 
NAFTA and Rest of the World regions each account for between 27.5 and 32 percent of global 
real GDP, while SADC only accounts for 0.6 percent of global GDP. Moreover, within SADC, 
the South Africa is dominant, accounting for 76 percent of SADC GDP while Botswana only 
accounts for 2.5 percent. Consequently, although this study focuses upon the ‘externalities’ of a 
specific FTA, it relates to a set of circumstances that might well be found with future PTAs. 
Namely a large economy, in this case the EU, negotiating a PTA with a much smaller economy, 
                                                 
17 Strictly the regions Botswana, South Africa and rest of SADC in the model do not fully identify the SADC 
regions because Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo are excluded. It is however as near to a 
SADC aggregation as is possible with the GTAP 5 Data Base. 
18 These proportions reflect the shares they would have received if there were no tariff revenue pool. 
19  The alertax closure minimises the effect on the data base of the shock by: (a) fixing the trade balances of all but 
one country; (b) setting the CES and CET elasticities to 1 and (c) altering the substitution (set to 0) and 
expansion (set to 1) parameters in the CDE system used in determining private consumption.  
20 The descriptive statistics use the GTAP Data Base after the adjustments imposed by the ‘altertax’ closure. 
 11
in this case the RSA, who has existing trade agreements with an even smaller neighbouring 
economy, in this case Botswana. 
 












Source: GTAP Data Base 
 
The differences in structure are not limited to size. Figure 2 provides information about the 
patterns of gross output for the EU and the SADC regions. From this data it is evident that 
Botswana is heavily dependent upon mining, with limited contributions from manufacturing, 
whereas the rest of SADC is more diversified, although heavily dependent upon primary 
commodity sectors. On the other hand South Africa has much more developed manufacturing 
sectors with very much less dependence upon agriculture. However, for both South Africa and the 
rest of SADC the ‘real’ size of manufacturing is arguably overstated because the heavy 
manufacturing sectors are typically specialised enterprises linked to the mining sectors. 
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Source: GTAP Data Base 
The differences in gross output structure carry over to the regional trade patterns (Figures 3 
and 4). Botswana has a polarised pattern of trade with its partners. The majority of its imports, by 
value, (59 percent) come from South Africa, with 13 percent of imports originating in the EU, 
whereas the majority, 57 percent, of exports go to the EU, with a further 19 percent going to the 
rest of Europe, and only 13.6 percent going to South Africa. Moreover Botswana’s imports are 
primarily manufactured commodities while mining commodities dominate its exports. South 
Africa’s trade is much more diversified, although the EU is the largest trade partner, 44 percent of 
imports and 35 percent of exports, with the rest of the world also accounting for substantial 
shares. Botswana only accounts for 1.3 percent of South Africa’s imports and 3.6 percent of her 
exports. South Africa’s exports and imports are dominated by manufacturing commodities, albeit 
the exports of heavy manufacturing depend, to some extent, on domestic mining activities. 
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Figure 3 Trade Patterns for Botswana and South Africa by Regional 
Partners 
















Source: GTAP Data Base 
 
The overall picture that emerges is one in which one developed economy, the EU, is entering 
into a PTA with a middle income economy that has well developed manufacturing capabilities 
with limited exports of food and agricultural commodities, the RSA, but that is in a customs 
union with a middle income economy that is dependent upon exports of primary products and 
imports of manufactured commodities, Botswana. Moreover the SACU has a regional agreement 
with economies that are much poorer and have even smaller manufacturing sectors and are 
dependent upon exports of primary commodities. Leaving aside the PTA with the EU, it is 
tempting to argue that the RSA might represent a potential ‘hub’ for a SADC wide PTA.21 
However once a PTA between the EU and RSA comes into being it is an open question as to how 
this might affect regional development in southern Africa. 
                                                 
21 Lewis et al., (2001) have questioned whether the RSA is sufficiently large as to act as an effective hub in  hub 
and spoke development in southern Africa. 
 14
Figure 4     Trade Patterns for Botswana and South Africa by Commodities 















Source: GTAP Data Base 
 
Model22 
The model used for these analyses is an adaptation of the standard GTAP comparative static CGE 
model. Since descriptions of that model are widely available, e.g., Hertel and Tsigas (1997), the 
comments here will refer to the model closure rules, which depart from those in the standard 
GTAP model, and a change in the basic model. 
The standard GTAP model contains the assumption that all tariff revenues ‘earned’ by a 
country accrue directly to that country. But, while SACU members impose common tariff rates 
they do not receive the revenue directly; rather the revenue is pooled and distributed according to 
a revenue sharing formula. Hence there are intra-country transfers of tariff revenues, which are 
not recorded in the data base, and that are subject to change with changes in tariff rates. Hence a 
tariff revenue pool was created in the model that gathered together all tariff revenues ‘earned’ in 
SACU and then distributed those revenues using the revenue sharing formula. 
Closure 
The second major change is a set of adjustments to the model closure rules (see Pyatt, 1988, on 
closure rules). The standard closure rules for the GTAP model were adjusted to provide a better 
reflection of the economies in southern Africa. Three fundamental changes were made to the 
closure: the first was related to fixing the trade balance, the second to employment of unskilled 
labour and the third to the prices and quantities on the world market of certain special 
commodities. 
                                                 
22 The model and associated data are available from the authors as a version of RunGTAP. 
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1) The trade balance for Botswana was fixed so as to mirror the policy of running a 
trade surplus. The purpose of this is to counter the effects of large diamond exports. 
Since diamond exports account for about 35 percent of world production, and an 
even larger proportion of gem quality production, it might be expected that 
Botswana would face a downward sloping export demand curve. However, 
Botswana is a core member of the Central Selling Organisation (CSO)23 and 
therefore both the price and quantity of diamond exports are effectively fixed, and 
hence are fixed in the model (see point 3 below). In examining the EU RSA FTA the 
ratio of the trade balance to income was fixed for all the African economies and the 
rest of world. In order to fix the ratio of the trade balance to income savings were 
allowed to change as a proportion of income. 
2) Alterations were also made to more accurately reflect the labour markets of the 
African economies (and also the Rest of World). In these countries there is typically 
an excess supply of unskilled labour, which can be drawn on by industries in the 
event of increased production. Hence, an assumption of full employment is 
inappropriate for these countries. In all the African regions and the rest of world the 
real wage rate was fixed exogenously and the supply of labour was endogenised. 
This allowed us to take account of the effect on unemployment within Africa of the 
EU RSA FTA. 
3) The final group of changes made to the standard GTAP closure relate to specific 
industries in the Botswana economy; including the mining industry, animal products 
and crops. Each of these is discussed in turn below: 
i) While Botswana is a large producer of diamonds the price and quantity of 
diamond exports are effectively fixed through Botswana’s membership of the 
CSO. This is captured by fixing the quantity and price (fob) of diamond 
exports to all regions. It could be argued that it is also appropriate to restrict 
tightly the input substitution possibilities in diamond production, e.g., to 
impose the assumption of Leontief production technologies. This additional 
restriction was tried in some simulations but made no substantive difference to 
the results; hence results are only reported for simulations that did not impose 
Leontief technologies. 
ii) Similarly Botswana has a long-standing preferential trade agreement with the 
EU under the auspices of the Lomé Convention, whereby fixed quantities of 
chilled, boneless beef can be exported duty free to the EU. To partially 
capture this relationship the quantity and price of processed from products 
from Botswana to the EU were fixed.24 
iii) Finally, Botswana is dependent on crop imports and, for climatic reasons, 
cannot realistically expand crop production; the possibility of export of crops 
from Botswana was also excluded. Halving the input substitution elasticities 
                                                 
23  The so-called de Beers cartel. 
24 Under the Cotonou Agreement this concession should end by 2008. This change was not included in the policy 
simulation because it is not a consequence of the EU RSA FTA. 
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captured the low potential and limited capacity for diversification in Batswana 
agriculture.25 
The analyses have included variations in these closure rules. The results from these 
explorations indicate that the results from these analyses are sensitive to the choice of closure 
rules; in particular the assumption of excess supplies of unskilled labour. The implications of 
such variations in closure are not explored further in this paper, but the results derived to date are 
indicative of the potential importance of the choice of closure rules to the results derived from 
GTAP based models for the implications of policy changes for developing regions. 
5. Analysis 
Policy Experiments 
The main policy experiment for which results are reported below is very simple; full liberalisation 
of trade between the EU and the RSA is implemented in a single step. This policy experiment 
amounts to making an assumption that an EU RSA FTA actually means free trade between the 
countries; which it might reasonably be concluded was the RSA’s desired outcome. Since 
Botswana is part of the SACU, it is assumed that trade liberalisation between the EU and RSA 
will equate to the elimination of import duties between the EU and Botswana, but that there will 
be no reciprocal elimination of import duties by the EU on trade with Botswana. This asymmetry 
in the liberalisation of trade between the EU and Botswana is an important part of the analyses. 
The analyses are comparative static; hence the analyses do not address potentially important 
questions relating to the sequencing of reforms and potential dynamic benefits from trade 
liberalisation. 
An important consideration is the treatment of the distribution of the tariff revenue pool. The 
proportions distributed to each member of the SACU are assumed fixed throughout the 
simulation period.   
But, the EU has historically been reluctant to liberalise its food and agricultural trade, and 
indeed most of the stumbling blocks prior to the signing of the EU RSA FTA seemed to involve 
discussions about the extent to which food and agricultural trade, especially trade in wine and 
related products, would be fully liberalised. Hence an additional series of experiments are 
reported for an experiment in which food and agricultural trade was only partially (50 percent) 
liberalised.26 The intention with these experiments was to consider the degree to which the 
liberalisation of agricultural and food trade influenced the impacts of the EU-RSA FTA. 
Results 
The real GDP changes, Figure 5, suggest that the beneficiaries of the EU RSA FTA will be the 
EU (0.004 percent or $(US) 344m of GDP) and South Africa (1.2 percent or $(US) 1670m of 
GDP). These results reflect the relatively high proportion of South African trade accounted for by 
the EU, and the relative lower proportion of EU trade accounted for by South Africa. There are 
clear suggestions of a ‘beggar thy neighbour outcome’ through the negative impacts of the FTA 
                                                 
25 The experiments were also run with the input substitution elasticities for crop agriculture set at one quarter of 
the base levels. While this damped down the response by crop agriculture in Botswana the difference was 
small. 
26 A 50 percent reduction in tariffs between the EU and RSA was assumed for crop agriculture, animal agriculture 
and food. Most of the exemptions in the EU-RSA FTA actually refer to commodities in the food aggregate.  
 17
on the Rest of SADC. Moreover there are negative impacts on all the other regions. In relative 
terms the reductions in GDP are greatest for the SADC region. 
The estimated welfare changes, equivalent variations, (the first column of results in Table 3) 
display the same pattern of benefits, but, because they are expressed in money metric welfare 
form, serve to highlight the absolute magnitude of the estimated benefits. Botswana experiences a 
decrease in welfare, which is made up of minor gains from allocative efficiency and the change in 
the price of capital goods that are offset by negative terms of trade and endowment effects where 
the endowment effect reflects a 0.1 percent decline in the use of unskilled labour in Botswana.27 
But the dominant factor is the reduction in revenue from the tax pool.28 Clearly the operation of 
the tax pool, which is central to the operation of SACU, is a substantial component of the welfare 
implications for Botswana. Moreover, since the operation of the tax pool can be adjusted by the 
member states of SACU, it would be possible to adjust the tax pool arrangements to counter these 
adverse welfare implications. Indeed the magnitudes of the welfare gains to South Africa and the 
EU, $(US) 1729m and $(US) 797m respectively, are such as to indicate that the costs of 
compensation would be minimal. 
























Source: Model Estimates 
The decompositions of the welfare gains to the EU and South Africa well illustrate the 
contrasting nature of the gains. South Africa gains primarily through the growth in employment 
of unskilled labour of 2.6 percent, (the endowment effect) and improvements in allocative 
efficiency, while the EU benefits through the terms of trade and allocative efficiency effects. For 
neither region are the other components of the welfare decomposition substantial components of 
the change in welfare. The welfare decompositions for all the other regions, illustrate a strong 
                                                 
27 The endowment effects can only be non-zero for regions with ‘surplus’ factors. 
28 The tax pool effect only impacts upon members of the SACU revenue pool. Note that while the nominal 
transfers and receipts associated with the tax pool are identical the welfare effects differ because of differences 
in preferences between South Africa and Botswana. 
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terms of trade effect.  For those regions, other than Botswana and South Africa, where the 
assumption of surplus unskilled labour is imposed (Rest of SADC, Rest of Africa and Rest of the 
World) the endowment effect is also a significant component of the negative impact on welfare, 
i.e., significant proportion of the adverse impact on other ‘developing’ regions arises primarily 
from reductions in the employment of unskilled labour. 
 
Table 3 Welfare decomposition ($US) – Full Liberalisation 















Botswana  -71.5 1.6 10.4 -1.1 -4.6 -77.8 -0.1 
South Africa  1729.5 350.0 39.4 1318.9 -66.5 77.6 10.1 
Rest of SADC -14.2 -4.5 0.8 -7.4 -3.1 0.0 0.0 
Rest of Africa -37.5 -8.8 -1.5 -13.9 -13.4 0.0 0.0 
EU 797.2 343.9 -23.9 0.0 477.1 0.0 0.0 
NAFTA -97.7 -3.0 -16.5 0.0 -78.1 0.0 0.0 
MERCUSOR -97.5 -29.7 -16.6 0.0 -51.2 0.0 0.0 
Rest of Europe -53.2 -7.5 0.0 0.0 -45.8 0.0 0.0 
Rest of 
America -23.2 -4.7 -4.3 0.0 -14.2 0.0 0.0 
Rest of the 
World -310.9 -70.4 12.3 -52.2 -200.6 0.0 0.0 
EU + South 
Africa 2526.6 693.9 15.5 1318.9 410.6 77.6 10.1 
All Other 
Regions -705.6 -126.9 -15.3 -74.6 -410.9 -77.8 -0.1 
Total 1821.1 567.0 0.2 1244.4 -0.3 -0.2 10.0 
a. Due to the change in preferences resulting from the fixed trade balance and endogenous savings rate. 
Source: Model Estimates 
Global welfare increases by ($(US) 1811m), but this aggregate hides the extent to which the 
EU and South Africa gain while other regions lose. The impact of the FTA on other regions is a 
triple negative; substantial losses from allocative efficiency (-$(US) 126.9m) and terms of trade (-
$(US) 410.9m) effects and through reductions in the employment of unskilled labour (-$(US) 
74.6m), while the EU and South Africa gain on each account, although the proportions differ 
between the allocative efficiency, endowment and terms of trade effects. 
The real GDP and welfare decomposition results hint at the fact that the patterns of gains and 
losses may be more complex than these simple aggregate measures indicate; that is indeed the 
case. It is important to note the assumptions implicit to the comparative static method of analysis. 
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When deriving the results it is assumed that all the regions have optimised to the new set of 
(price) incentives and hence that all the indicated resource shifts have taken place. When the 
aggregate results suggest that the changes in GDP and welfare are proportionately small, as they 
do here, and in other studies of trade liberalisation and integration (see Robinson and Thierfelder, 
1999), it is tempting to assume that the processes of adjustment implied by the aggregate results 
are also relatively small. If the required processes of adjustment are not small, then it is wise to 
consider them in assessing the actual costs and benefits of adjusting. Moreover for many African 
economies the processes of adjustment can be both slow and costly, as the experience of World 
Bank and IMF sponsored structural adjustment programmes has indicated. 
 
Figure 6 Changes in Sectoral Value Added (%) 
















Source: Model Estimates 
 
Some indication of the extent of adjustment associated with the small changes in real GDP 
and welfare can be gleaned from the changes in sectoral value added; see Figure 6, which reports 
proportionate changes in sectoral value added for the EU and SADC regions. It is immediately 
apparent that there are large incentives to reallocate resources in Botswana and South Africa. 
Botswana should move resources from animal agriculture, food and light and heavy 
manufacturing to crop agriculture and textiles, while South Africa should move resources into 
crop and animal agriculture, food and construction. For all commodities the changes predicted for 
the EU are all minimal, indeed for no sector does the change in value added exceed 0.14 percent; 
the largest effects are -0.139 and 0.096 percent for crop agriculture and textiles respectively. In 
contrast for the Rest of SADC the only noticeable positive effect is for mining (0.117 percent), 
whereas there are clear negative incentives (ranging from –0.43 to -0.07 percent reductions in 
value added) across all the manufacturing sectors. 
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Table 4 Changes in Commodity Exports ($USm) 
 Botswana South Africa Rest of SADC EU 
Crop Agriculture 0.00 277.24 10.44 -111.36 
Animal Agriculture 0.73 18.30 0.22 -0.33 
Mining 0.00 -63.20 7.56 -17.03 
Food -10.42 2123.37 -28.94 413.83 
Textiles 3.98 197.47 -8.79 300.30 
Heavy Manufacturing -1.26 425.30 -5.96 249.88 
Light Manufacturing -28.93 502.16 -3.29 1231.63 
Utilities 0.10 -4.17 1.07 -12.42 
Construction 0.31 0.34 0.25 -15.88 
Services 8.46 14.37 12.43 -400.16 
Source: Model Estimates 
These results are suggestive of substantial structural changes post the EU RSA FTA. While 
these changes are most substantial for Botswana and South Africa, those for the Rest of SADC 
are not insubstantial. In combination they are large enough to suggest the requirement for an 
appreciable transformation process in southern Africa before equilibrium is re-established. 
Furthermore the changes in commodity output and value added are suggestive of forces moving 
the economies of southern Africa away from manufacturing towards food production, both 
directly from within agriculture and through food processing activities. For regions with 
legitimate aspirations to diversify their economies and industrialise, these results represent 
outcomes that are unlikely to be deemed politically attractive. 
Table 5  Changes in Commodity Imports ($USm) 
 Botswana South Africa Rest of SADC EU 
Crop Agriculture -3.10 74.83 -3.89 149.30 
Animal Agriculture -0.54 13.90 -0.43 7.86 
Mining 0.38 6.76 -0.38 1.69 
Food 3.15 1440.19 -2.01 1111.86 
Textiles 2.45 188.38 -0.21 169.56 
Heavy Manufacturing -10.07 586.95 -3.48 320.13 
Light Manufacturing 2.54 1497.58 -3.62 617.31 
Utilities -0.19 0.03 -0.76 5.19 
Construction -0.12 1.73 -0.11 11.06 
Services -2.84 14.02 -5.79 254.34 
Source: Model Estimates 
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The trade results (Tables 4 and 5) indicate why South Africa might be enthusiastic about the 
EU RSA FTA; strong export growth is indicated for animal agriculture, textiles and light 
manufacturing and exceptionally strong growth for food. Similarly the results indicate that the EU 
will experience substantial export growth in manufactured commodities. It is however noticeable 
that the EU’s export growth is concentrated in non-food manufactured commodities while South 
Africa’s export growth is heavily concentrated in food exports. This pattern carries over to direct 
agricultural exports where the EU experiences reduced crop exports while South Africa 
experiences appreciable growth. For Botswana minimal growth in the exports of services and 
textiles are indicated with declining exports of food and light manufacturing, whereas for the Rest 
of SADC manufacturing exports decline and agricultural exports increase. 
 
Figure 7a Factor Demand by Activity for Botswana 
















Source: Model Estimates 
 
On the import side, food and manufacturing imports to South Africa and the EU increase 
substantially, while there is an across the board decline in imports to the Rest of SADC and only 
food and textiles imports to Botswana increase. As with the changes in the patterns of exports, the 
changes in imports by the EU and South Africa are indicative of appreciable differences in the 
sectoral impacts of the EU RSA FTA upon the signatories. Thus while the benefits for the EU and 
South Africa are appreciable, the impacts upon Botswana and the Rest of SADC indicate that 
they may be much less enthusiastic about the EU RSA FTA. 
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Figure 7b Factor Demand by Activity for South Africa 
















Source: Model Estimates 
 
The combination of the changes in sectoral value added and trade flows suggest that the EU 
RSA FTA will result in substantial changes in the patterns of incentives across Africa. Despite the 
small (relative) changes in GDP and welfare, Botswana, South Africa and the Rest of SADC are 
predicted to experience substantial adjustments in the patterns of factor demand, see Figures 7a, 
7b and 7c. Such substantial changes in the patterns of employment would understandably raise 
concerns in Botswana, especially in light of the declining employment in manufacturing 
industries, except textiles, and the decline in total employment of unskilled labour (-0.1 percent). 
On the other hand South Africa might be more sanguine; the substantial increases in employment 
in agriculture, food and construction would offset the relatively small declines in employment by 
light manufacturing, mining and services and there is a useful boost in total employment of 
unskilled labour (2.6 percent). Moreover, the substantial increases in agricultural employment 
might assist with rural income redistribution objectives since much of the employment growth is 
in agriculture. The changes for the Rest of SADC are all relatively minor, but also indicate a 
move of employment away from manufacturing that may not be welcomed by governments. The 
changes in employment patterns for the EU are all small in proportionate terms but indicate how 
the FTA would reduce employment in food and agriculture while expanding employment in 
manufacturing. 
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Figure 7c Factor Demand by Activity for Rest of SADC 
















Source: Model Estimates 
 
Figure 7d Factor Demand by Activity for the EU – Full Liberalisation 
















Source: Model Estimates 
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Historically the EU has been reluctant to engage in a ‘genuine’ FTA, but rather has preferred 
to engage in preferential trade agreements that do not involve substantive reductions in the 
support provided to the European agricultural and food industries under the CAP. It is clear from 
the information that is available about the details of the EU RSA FTA that this trade agreement 
has also involved only a partial liberalisation of food and agriculture trade between the partners. 
The results for the EU provide some indication of why the EU has been reluctant to liberalise 
trade in food and agriculture; employment in agriculture and food will decline while food and 
agriculture imports increase and agricultural exports decrease, although food exports will expand. 
On the other hand the results for South Africa indicate why South Africa would very much want a 
liberalisation of the food and agriculture trade with the EU; food and agriculture imports and 
exports expand appreciably, with the increase in exports substantially exceeding the increase in 
imports, and there are matching increases in employment in food and agriculture. It is 
consequently instructive to examine how the apparent gains from an EU RSA FTA would be 
affected by a partial liberalisation of trade in food and agriculture. Here a partial liberalisation is 
defined as a 50 percent cut in tariffs on food and agricultural commodities, with a 100 percent 
reductions on other commodities. The results are discussed briefly below. 
 
























Source: Model Estimates 
 
It is evident from the results for a full liberalisation of trade between the EU and South Africa 
that a substantial proportion of the gains for South Africa come from expansions in the food and 
agriculture sectors, both in terms of trade flows and employment. Partial liberalisation reduces the 
GDP gain for South Africa from 1.2 percent to 0.63 percent while very marginally reducing the 
gain for the EU (0.0043 to 0.0038 percent). This reflects the substantial differences in the sectoral 
patterns of gains and losses for the EU and South Africa. Those sectors of South Africa’s 
economy that grow with full liberalisation experience less growth while the reverse applies in the 
EU. On the other hand, while the positive GDP impact on Botswana increases slightly, there is 
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little amelioration of the negative impacts of the EU RSA FTA upon other regions. More 
interesting are the welfare implications. The gross benefits to the EU and South Africa decline by 
some 38 percent, but South Africa’s welfare gain declines by 54 percent while the EU’s welfare 
gain decreases by only 3 percent. The key component of the loss to South Africa is the reduction 
in the endowment effect, which accounts for two thirds of the reduction in potential welfare 
gains. Since the endowment effect arises from the increases in the employment of unskilled 
labour, a key implication of a partial liberalisation is that South Africa fails to realise 
approximately 50 percent of the employment boost that could have been achieved with full 
liberalisation. 
 
Table 6 Welfare decomposition ($USm) – Partial Liberalisation 
















Botswana  -42.9 0.4 10.7 -0.4 0.2 -53.7 -0.1 
South Africa  792.9 161.4 44.1 708.7 -182.6 53.6 7.5 
Rest of SADC 4.6 -2.5 0.8 -0.7 7.0 0.0 0.0 
Rest of Africa -20.1 -4.4 -1.0 -6.9 -7.8 0.0 0.0 
EU 770.5 301.7 -27.4 0.0 496.1 0.0 0.0 
NAFTA -91.4 -6.5 -17.9 0.0 -67.0 0.0 0.0 
MERCUSOR -49.9 -16.0 -9.1 0.0 -24.8 0.0 0.0 
Rest of Europe -51.2 -10.1 -0.4 0.0 -40.7 0.0 0.0 
Rest of America -11.6 -2.0 -2.6 0.0 -7.0 0.0 0.0 
Rest of the World -346.2 -69.7 2.9 -105.2 -174.2 0.0 0.0 
EU + South 
Africa 1563.3 463.2 16.7 708.7 313.6 53.6 7.5 
All Other Regions -608.7 -110.9 -16.5 -113.1 -314.4 -53.7 -0.1 
Total 954.6 352.3 0.2 595.6 -0.8 -0.1 7.4 
a. Due to the change in preferences resulting from the fixed trade balance and endogenous savings rate. 
Source: Model Estimates 
 
Partial liberalisation damps down the negative welfare implications for all other regions that 
stem from the EU RSA FTA; hence the ‘beggar thy neighbour’ effects are reduced. The change in 
global situation is most striking. While the aggregate negative impact of the welfare of regions 
other that the EU and South Africa decline (by $(US) 96.9m), the positive welfare effects for the 
EU and South Africa decline even further (by $(US) 963.3m); hence the global impact is negative 
(-$(US) 866.4m). The vast majority of the impact comes through the reduced endowment effect 
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in the South Africa. These results indicate that a partial liberalisation of agricultural and food 
trade can only be marginally justified on the grounds of ameliorating the adverse impacts of the 
FTA on other regions. 
Moreover this partial liberalisation does not ameliorate the structural change effects of the full 
liberalisation of EU RSA trade. As the changes in value added, Figure 9, indicate the implied 
changes in employment structure remain substantial, with the major difference being the large 
reductions in the growth of value added in food and agriculture for South Africa. Hence the 
changing patterns of incentives associated with a full liberalisation of trade remain, but at the cost 
of a substantial reduction in the welfare gains for South Africa. 
 
Figure 9 Changes in Sectoral Value Added (%)–Partial Liberalisation 
















Source: Model Estimates 
 
6. Concluding Comments 
The EU, through the Cotonou Agreement, has committed itself to seeking a series of preferential 
trading agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) nations that were signatories 
to the Lomé Conventions. This commitment is predated upon the presumption that such 
agreements will provide an environment within which the ACP states can prosper. As the 
literature on customs unions has long recognised (e.g., Lipsey, 1957 and 1960) the impacts of 
preferential trade agreements involve general equilibrium effects and second best considerations; 
hence there may be winners and losers. The analyses reported in this paper are particularly 
concerned with the extent to which third parties might be affected by a bilateral free trade 
agreement between the EU and the RSA. The results are clearly a product of the way the 
economic systems are modeled, and consequently may change if allowance is made for imperfect 
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competition, scale economies and dynamics; these are questions that do not appear to have been 
addressed in a systematic and quantitative manner. Nevertheless they indicate that this bilateral 
agreement may have noticeable adverse consequences for nations that are not party to the FTA 
and are often less developed than the signatories; and that these adverse consequences are more 
likely to reduce than increase the well-being of the least well off in those regions. A result that 
runs counter to the EU’s professed policies towards developing countries. 
The results indicate that the EU RSA FTA will produce appreciable welfare gains for the EU 
and South Africa by promoting allocative efficiency in both partners’ economies, employment 
growth in South Africa and improvements in the terms of trade for the EU. The incentives for the 
EU and the RSA to form a FTA are therefore clear. But these gains are acquired at the expense of 
the rest of the global economy, which loses out through reductions in allocative efficiency, 
employment and the terms of trade. These negative effects are most pronounced among the 
African states and in particular those states in SADC, with Botswana being the major loser. While 
the welfare effects are relatively small, the losses are only small if the economies of sub-Saharan 
Africa (SSA) can achieve appreciable structural changes, which history suggests is not an easy 
transformation. Moreover the structural changes that are implied involve reductions in 
manufacturing capacities in SSA: changes that may be politically unpopular. 
The results for an FTA indicate that many of the gains for South Africa come through the 
expansion of food and agricultural production and trade. However, the EU RSA FTA only 
includes a partial liberalisation of trade in food and agricultural commodities. The results for a 
partial liberalisation of trade between the EU and South Africa alter the conclusions. Although 
South Africa still experiences a welfare gain, its value is nearly halved while the EU still 
experiences the same welfare gain, and South Africa’s neighbours still experience major changes 
in the structure of incentives and either welfare losses or no gains in welfare. Moreover the 
reduction in the increase in the employment of unskilled labour in South Africa indicates that a 
major potential component of pro-poor growth in South Africa, which might be considered a 
desirable objective of an EU RSA FTA, is drastically reduced. 
The results indicate that if the EU is serious about assisting African development through 
trade agreements then the EU needs to engage in comprehensive programmes of evaluation 
before entering into such agreements. These evaluations should identify not only the gains and 
losses for the immediate signatories, but also for third parties. Furthermore, the critical 
importance of the liberalisation of trade in food and agricultural products for the gains from a 
trade agreement to South Africa, coupled with the very low cost of such concessions to the EU, 
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Appendix 1:  The Data 
 
Table A1 Aggregation of Commodities 
Model 
Commodities GTAP 5 Commodities 
Crop Agriculture Paddy rice; Wheat; Cereal grains nec; Vegetables; fruit; nuts; Oil seeds; Sugar 
cane; sugar beet; Plant-based fibers; Crops nec; Fishing; Forestry 
Animal Agriculture Bovine cattle; sheep and goats; horses; Animal products nec; Raw milk; Wool; 
silk-worm cocoons 
Fuels & Minerals Coal; Oil; Gas; Minerals nec; Petroleum; coal products 
Food Products Bovine cattle, sheep and goat, horse meat prods; Meat products nec; Dairy 
products; Vegetable oils and fats; Processed rice; Sugar; Food products nec; 
Beverages and tobacco products; 
Textiles Textiles; Wearing apparel; Leather products; 
Heavy 
Manufacturing 
Wood products; Paper products; publishing; Chemical; rubber; plastic products; 
Mineral products nec; Ferrous metals; Metals nec; Metal products; 
Light 
Manufacturing 
Motor vehicles and parts; Transport equipment nec; Electronic equipment; 
Machinery and equipment nec; Manufactures nec; 
Utilities Electricity; Gas manufacture; distribution; Water; 
Construction Construction; 
Services 
Trade; Transport nec; Sea transport; Air transport; Communication; Financial 




Table A2 Aggregation of Regions 
Model Region GTAP 5 Regions 
Botswana Botswana 
South Africa SACU less Botswana 
Rest of SADC Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Rest of 
southern Africa 
Rest of Africa Morocco, Rest of North Africa, Uganda, Rest of sub-Saharan Africa 
EU Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Belgium
NAFTA Canada, United States of America, Mexico 
MERCUSOR Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 
Rest of Europe Switzerland, Rest of EFTA, Hungary, Poland, Rest of Central 
European Assoc 
Rest of America Central America and the Caribbean, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Rest 
of Andean Pact, Rest of South America 
Rest of the World Australia, New Zealand, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Viet 
Nam, Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia, Former 
Soviet Union, Turkey, Rest of Middle East, Rest of World 
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Appendix 2:  Model Closure Rules 
 
The standard GTAP policy closure was adjusted in the following ways: 
1) Trade Balance  
swap DTBALR("bwa") = dpsave(“bwa”); 
swap DTBALR("xsc") = dpsave(“xsc”); 
swap DTBALR("sad") = dpsave(“sad”); 
swap DTBALR("xaf") = dpsave(“xaf”); 
swap DTBALR("xwo") = dpsave(“xwo”); 
2) Employment 
swap qo("unsklab","bwa") = pfactreal("unsklab","bwa"); 
swap qo("unsklab","xsc") = pfactreal("unsklab","xsc"); 
swap qo("unsklab","sad") = pfactreal("unsklab","sad"); 
swap qo("unsklab","xaf") = pfactreal("unsklab","xaf"); 
swap qo("unsklab","xwo") = pfactreal("unsklab","xwo"); 
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3) Industry-Specific29  
a) Exports and the world price of other minerals (diamonds) were fixed30  
swap qxs("mine","bwa",REG) = tms("mine","bwa",REG); 
swap pfob("mine","bwa",REG) = txs("mine","bwa",REG); 
b) Fix quantity and price of Botswana’s exports of meats to Europe 
swap qxs("food","bwa","eur") = tms("food","bwa","eur"); 
swap pfob("ani","bwa","eur") = rxs("ani","bwa","eur"); 
c) Fix Exports of agricultural crops by Botswana 
swap qxw("crops","bwa") = tm("crops","bwa"); 
 
                                                 
29  The method used to fix the quantities and prices of exports was adapted from Adams et al., (forthcoming). The 
variables rms, rxs and rm operate as rents associated with the closure conditions. 
30  Some solution difficulties are encountered when fixing total exports of minerals from Botswana; hence the use 
of the less general closure condition whereby Botswana’s mineral exports by destination are fixed. 
